Introduction

The 2015 NCARB by the Numbers, an annual publication of the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB), provided a comprehensive analysis of architectural licensing candidates. The results established that the architecture licensure process in the U.S. is taking nearly 14.5 years to complete. The 2009 NCARB Roster revealed that the boards of architectural examiners in all fifty U.S. states, along with other U.S. territories, are participating members of NCARB. This roster further exposed the close relationship among the exam vendor, accreditation agency, and professional organizations that lead the architecture licensure process in the U.S.

This policy analysis is written for review by the office of the governor in the fifty U.S. jurisdictions to assess the need for public intervention to dismantle monopoly control over the architecture profession. Following Bardach’s eightfold path, this paper addresses the following problem statement: There are too many state boards of examiners serving as agents of affiliate organizations, representing a state-sponsored monopoly resulting in negative externalities imposed on practitioners. For this analysis I present: (a) a case for public intervention; (b) justification for two alternative solutions; and (c) examination of three selection criteria for each alternative. I periodically refer to the Criteria Alternative Matrix (CAM) and tables in the appendix. The incumbent system, or any hybrid of business as usual, is not considered a feasible option and is therefore omitted from the CAM.

A Case for Public Intervention

The boards of architectural examiners are public officials holding the authority to grant professional licensure to practice architecture within their respective jurisdictions as a non-depletable public service. Board members may be salaried or reimbursed for expenses. Regardless of compensation, each board member takes an oath to hold public office with two primary objectives: protection of the public and regulation of the architecture profession. In fulfillment of these objectives, the boards select licensure paths that are then adopted into state legislation. The governor of each state has the authority to appoint and remove individuals serving on these boards. However, nearly all boards are self-nominating, which means that the individuals put forth to the governor’s nomination committee have been selected by the boards themselves.

Such a nomination structure is susceptible to monopolization; over time these boards have become corporatized, leading to a state-sponsored monopoly on the architecture licensure process. As this monopoly extends across state boundaries, corporatization of this public service impedes preference revelation as defined in Tiebout’s model. This lack of variance in public services restricts the ability of an individual to relocate to a U.S. jurisdiction where public services meet their preference (Lovenheim & Turner, 2017). Practitioners in the architecture profession within the U.S. have limited options for licensure paths as allocated by a monopoly.

The path to architecture licensure recognized by all boards is composed of a professional degree, work experience, and examination. Each of these steps is controlled by private affiliated organizations. The National Architectural Accrediting Board (NAAB) is the sole accrediting agency for architecture school recognized by the boards. National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB) is the sole exam vendor for the Architect Registration Examination (ARE). NCARB also serves as the state vendor for maintaining the work-experience record required by the boards. The American Institute of Architects (AIA) is the parent organization that created both NAAB and NCARB. Several sources confirm shared leadership and exchange of money among these affiliated organizations: (a) NCARB Roster; (b) federal tax records; (c) shared business addresses; (d) website synchronization; (e) organizational bylaws; and (f) decades of commingling among leadership.

Architectural school graduates attain a five-year NAAB-accredited professional degree which serves as the base qualification to sit for NCARB’s ARE. Other degree types are considered non-professional and therefore not accepted by a majority of the boards. This excludable bias toward NAAB degrees directly contradicts the human-capital model, which rewards an individual with each year of education. In further contradiction, a handful of boards only partially accept a non-NAAB degree. For example, the California board penalizes graduates of non-NAAB programs by shaving off an entire year of education that counts toward licensure qualifications.

NAAB five-year programs, however, fail to meet federal equivalency to other professional degree programs, which require a minimum of six years of education. In comparison to law and medical degrees, architecture falls short by three years. Traditionally architecture programs are compared to engineering programs, where only a four-year degree qualifies a graduate for engineering licensure. Technically this puts the architecture school graduate at a higher human capital, yet engineer licensure attainment spans a much shorter timeframe (ABET, 2015).

The NCARB Roster has exposed that boards of architectural examiners in all U.S. territories actively hold leadership roles involving indirect benefits, reimbursements, or direct salary within these affiliated organizations. For example, in 2015 the active president of NCARB served on the Vermont state board of examiners while a controlling board member of NCARB served as president of the California Architects Board. As boards actively award public contracts to these private organizations, a blatant conflict of interest exists. Anti-corruption legislation in most U.S. jurisdictions construes this sort of relationship as one where the boards have a financial interest in the public contracts they are awarding.

Does a board member have a direct or indirect financial interest in a contract being made either by the board or by any agency under the board’s jurisdiction? If so, and the contract is made, the member may be subject to criminal sanctions and the contract may be void and any private gain received by the official under the contract may have to be returned.

California Attorney General’s Office, 2010

Monopolies on professions can lead to negative externalities for the practitioner and the public. Without unbiased oversight, monopoly control can convert this public service into a rivalrous commodity. NCARB holds the power to control the number of times a practitioner fails and must retake licensure exams in order to meet the organization’s bottom line. Additional negative externalities in the form of information asymmetry can be created with prolonged control of a public service by a dominating monopoly (Lovenheim & Turner, 2017). Licensure is a high-stakes signal to employers per the signaling model; progression of the architecture profession relies on a transparent licensure process. Information asymmetry makes it extremely difficult for competing exam vendors to accumulate expertise to the same breadth as NCARB. There is no accountability for NCARB to truthfully and transparently communicate exam content, exam grading, or pass rates.

Regarding accreditation oversight, the U.S. Department of Education (USDOE) holds accreditation commissions accountable to minimal ethical and academic standards through a rigorous recognition process. Boards do not have resources budgeted to provide such oversight. NAAB is not recognized by the USDOE. Without unbiased oversight, NAAB has no accountability to provide quality accreditation to the schools; the system can lead to an uncertain fate for the quality of education offered at the schools of architecture. Education can become stagnant with stale standards, depleting the human capital of graduates. The incumbent system is exposed to corruption such as bribery of state officials, altering of exam results, and market control. Public intervention is an urgent necessity to dismantle the monopolization of the state boards of architectural examiners.

Alternative I: Focused Affirmation and Increased Oversight

Although conflict-of-interest laws exist in all state legislatures, such conflict is commonplace on the boards. California requires board members to complete Form 700, disclosing direct and indirect financial interests, and has a nomination committee in the Department of Consumer Affairs that screens prospective candidates prior to appointment by the governor. Even with these processes in place, leadership within the affiliated organizations dominates the California board. Conflict of interest is either being hidden, overlooked, or dismissed. A stronger alternative is therefore justified.

First, this alternative proposes that all new appointees to public office file a focused statement of independence explicitly stating independence from the exam vendor, accreditation commission, or their affiliated organizations. Appointees must verbally affirm such independence as part of their oath of office. Verbal affirmations are conducted publicly and are often transcribed for public record. Verbal disclosures raise the level of personal accountability and moral commitment due to an added threat of perjury (Keskel, 2002). With recorded incidences of corporate perjury, a focused affirmation might become rhetorical jargon in the long run.

Second, boards must have a system of oversight. Such a system should include employment of a trained psychometrician to hold the exam vendor continuously accountable. Results of licensure examination must be reported directly to the state and not the exam vendor, for protection of practitioners against score meddling. Boards must either have a strenuous recognition process for accreditation commissions or must only accept commissions that are recognized by the USDOE.

Selection Criterion A: Acceptability

Although the transparency of this alternative is undeniable, the incumbent organizations would likely raise objection. One argument that could be posed is that the exam vendor and the accreditor both have decades of experience presiding over the licensure process. They might argue that the learning curve of independent boards would not be worth a transparent system. Lawmakers would have to win over this argument to side with an ethical solution for public safety and consumer protection. As acceptability of this alternative is extremely political, this criterion holds a higher weight in the CAM.

Selection Criterion B: Equity

This solution is equitable as it increases competition among exam vendors and accreditors. Antitrust doctrines have proven that competition can lead to higher quality and lower prices. Since a monopoly has reigned over the architecture licensure process for decades, competitors are likely to develop slowly; therefore this criterion holds the lowest weight, but the option is likely to hold a high level of equity in the long run.

Selection Criterion C: Cost

When assessing public-policy changes, Bardach points to the lack of funding as a typical downfall of a policy alternative. This solution proposes the need for a psychometrician to hold the exam vendor accountable. The annual salary for this position as published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics is $100,000. NCARB by the Numbers indicates that 3,000 practitioners sit for the ARE each year. Each practitioner pays an exam fee of $204. The cost to employ a psychometrician in each of the fifty boards, if recouped through exam fees, would drive up the cost per exam by approximately $9. Competition among exam vendors, however, could lead to a decrease in fees by as much as $100 per exam, in correlation with other competitive high-stakes exams such as nursing licensing exams or those required for college admissions. Any increase in exam fees would likely be more than offset through competition. Boards that choose to recognize a USDOE accreditor would incur no additional cost. As cost is an important consideration for protection of practitioners, this criterion holds the middle weight in the CAM.

Alternative II: Public Election of Board of Examiners

As individuals who serve on the boards are appointed by the governor, it may appear simple for the governor to remove those with a conflict of interest and reappoint the positions from a new pool of candidates. Such a solution, however, would not be sustainable. As the next governor is elected and a new administration steps in, business as usual will slowly creep back and the problem will re-emerge. This alternative proposes that board of examiner positions be placed on the ballot alongside other elected positions within state general elections, requiring a public vote. Such a system would naturally lend itself to fair competition, transparency, and public discretion. Due to information asymmetry, it is foreseeable that the incumbent boards would hold greater campaign leverage and funding in comparison to independent newcomers. Public discretion is a viable option that has proven to work in the U.S. democratic government structure (Kennedy, 2014).

Selection Criterion A: Acceptability

Politics is a dominating focus for most Americans. People perceive elections as an inherently fair system. The ability to elect boards would be a welcome addition to the state ballot. According to Kennedy, the right to vote has been a cornerstone of American democracy imparted by the U.S. Constitution. This option is likely to achieve high acceptability.

Selection Criterion B: Equity

According to Bloomberg, only 40 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in state general elections. Elections of boards would directly impact practitioners’ ability to obtain a license to practice as a signal for higher wages, so voter turnout among practitioners would likely be higher. NCARB by the Numbers indicates that there are 100,000 licensed architects and 50,000 exam candidates in the nation each year. That averages about 3,000 eligible architectural practitioners per state. An election for boards would yield roughly 1,200 practitioner voters per state. Such small numbers might not appear equitable until compared to the handful of individuals who currently sit on nomination committees, where the ultimate appointment is made by a single individual, the governor. This option is likely to hold a high level of equity.

Selection Criterion C: Cost

The U.S. National Budget Commission indicates that the average cost of passing new regulations in state legislature can be up to $900. The majority of cost would be expended on election campaigns by candidates for board seats. Aristotle International publishes data on local political campaign cost as $1 per voter, or in this case per practitioner. This averages about $3,000 in campaign funds per seat with an average of eight seats per board, which brings the sum of campaign costs expended by all candidates within a single state to $24,000. The market impact would mirror the savings accumulated by an average state legislature from lack of effort required by nomination committees. Electronic ballot scanners are already utilized for current state elections. Any costs related to voting would likely be minimal and are not considered as part of this alternative. This option is likely to hold low cost.

Conclusion

At the start of this analysis both alternatives appeared nearly viable, but the CAM provides a means of measurement to quantify the outcomes. Policy Alternatives for State Board of Architectural Examiners CAM indicates that Alternative II, public vote for appointment of board members, is the single strong solution of the two alternatives examined. This base case is justifiable as it has been critically examined for both pros and cons in consideration of Bardach’s common pitfalls within the three selection criteria: cost, acceptability, and equity. The Bardach eightfold process has provided a fluid policy analysis to yield clear results.

Appendix